In this paper, we re-visit the problem of unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) and unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) in a directed network under the presence of a threshold adaptive Byzantine adversary, having unbounded computing power. Desmedt et.al [5] have given the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of URMT and USMT protocols in directed networks. Though their protocols are efficient, they are not communication optimal. In this paper, we prove for the first time the lower bound on the communication complexity of URMT and USMT protocols in directed networks. Moreover, we show that our bounds are tight by giving efficient communication optimal URMT and USMT protocols, whose communication complexity satisfies our proven lower bounds.
Introduction
Consider the following problem: a sender S and a receiver R are a part of directed synchronous network and are connected by uni-directional vertex disjoint paths/channels (also called as wires), which are directed either from S to R or vice-versa. An adversary A t having unbounded computing power controls at most t wires between S and R in Byzantine fashion. S intends to communicate a message M S containing field elements from a finite field F to R. The challenge is to design a protocol such that after interacting in phases 1 as per the protocol, R should output M R where M R = M S with probability at least 1 − poly(κ)2 −κ and κ is the error parameter. Moreover this should hold irrespective of the way adversary controls the t wires. This problem is called unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) [7, 5] . The problem of unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) [7, 5] has an additional restriction that at the end of the protocol, the adversary should have no information about M S in information theoretic sense.
If S and R are directly connected by a private channel, as assumed in generic secure multiparty computation protocols [2, 13, 3, 9] , then reliable and secure communication between them is guaranteed. However this assumption implies that the underlying network is a complete graph, which is impractical! In incomplete networks, where S and R are NOT directly connected, URMT/USMT protocols help to simulate a reliable/secure link with very high probability. There is another motivation to study USMT protocols. Currently, the security of all existing public key cryptosystems, digital signature schemes, etc are based on unproven hardness assumptions of certain number theoretic problems. However with increase in computing speed and advent of new computing paradigm like Quantum computing may render these assumptions to be baseless. In such a scenario, USMT protocols will help to achieve information theoretic security against an all powerful adversary with very high probability.
Existing Literature: In [6] Dolev et.al have shown that PRMT/PSMT between S and R tolerating A t is possible in an undirected network iff there exists 2t + 1 bidirectional wires between S and R. this paper, we prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of multiphase (more than one phase) URMT(USMT) protocols 2 , which reliably(securely) sends a message containing field elements. Moreover, we show that our bounds are tight by giving efficient, polynomial time communication optimal URMT/USMT protocols which are first of their kind. Specifically, we show that (a) There exists an O(u) phase URMT protocol, which reliably sends κ bits by communicating O( κ) bits. Thus we get reliability with constant factor overhead in communication complexity. Since any URMT protocol to send κ bits needs to communicate Ω( κ) bits, our protocol is communication optimal. (b) If at least one wire in the bottom band is un-corrupted, then there exists an O(u) phase USMT protocol which securely sends κ bits by communicating O( κ) bits. Thus we achieve security with constant factor overhead in communication complexity. It is easy to see that the protocol is communication optimal. (c) If full bottom band is corrupted by A t , then any multiphase USMT protocol needs to communicate Ω n u κ bits to securely sends ( κ) bits. Moreover, we show that the bound is tight by designing an O(u) phase USMT which sends ( κ) bits by communicating O n u κ bits. To design our protocols, we use several new techniques, which are of independent interest. For ease of exposition, we assume that if S (R) is expecting some value(s) in some specific format from R (S) along a wire and if nothing (or some syntactically incorrect value(s)) comes, then S (R) substitutes predefined value(s) from F in the same specific format and continue the protocol. Thus, we separately do not consider the case when nothing or something syntactically incorrect comes along a wire.
Tools Used: 1. Unconditionally Reliable Authentication: It is used to send a message M over a wire such that if the wire is uncorrupted, then R correctly gets M and if the wire is corrupted, then R does not get M but is able to detect the corruption with very high probability. This is done as follows: Let a non-zero (a, b) ∈ R F 2 is securely established between S and R in advance. S computes [9] , the probability that M = M , but still R fails to detect it is at most 1 |F| , which is negligible in our context. Note that a remains information theoretically secure, even if the adversary knows (M, x) by listening the wire.
Unconditionally Secure Authentication:
Its goal is similar to unconditionally reliable authentication, except that adversary should not get any information about M . This is done as follows: Let (a, b, c) ∈ R F 3 − {(0, 0, 0)}, which is securely established between S and R in advance. S computes (x, y) = U Sauth(M ; a, b, c) = (M + a, b(M + a) + c) and sends (x, y) to R over the wire. Let R receives (x , y ) along the wire. R verifies y ? = bx + c. If the test fails then R concludes that wire is corrupted, else R recovers x − a. It is easy to see that if the adversary knows (x, y), then also M is information theoretic secure. Moreover, if (x , y ) = (x, y), then except with error probability of at most 1 |F| (which is negligible), R will be able to detect it. [1] . Here k is called the hash key. The probability that two different vectors map to the same hash value for an uniformly chosen hash key is at most |F| . If A t knows only k and hash(k; v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v ), then − 1 elements in the vector will be information theoretically secure.
Unconditional Hashing
4. Extracting Randomness: Suppose S and R by some means agree on a sequence of n random numbers x = [x 1 x 2 . . . x n ] ∈ F n such that A t knows n − f components of x, but has no information about the other f components of x. However S and R do not know which values are known to A t . The goal of S and R is to agree on a sequence of f elements [y 1 y 2 . . . y f ] ∈ F f , such that A t has no information about [y 1 y 2 . . . y f ]. This is done as follows [11] :
Algorithm EXTRAND n,f (x): Let V be a n×f Vandermonde matrix with members in F. This matrix is published as a part of the algorithm specification. S and R both locally compute the product [y1 y2 . . .
2 Three Phase USMT Protocol of Desmedt et.al [5, 12] We now briefly recall the three phase USMT protocol of [5] to send a message m S ∈ F from S to R. We call the protocol as Π Existing . Though we present the protocol in terms of phases, it was actually presented in terms of rounds in [5] , where in each round, either S or R does some communication through a wire in top or bottom band respectively. But one can easily verify that when expressed in terms of phases, the USMT protocol of [5] takes three phases. The current informal description of the protocol is taken from [12] , where as the formal description is taken from [5] . The main goal of recalling the protocol here is to highlight few techniques which are used in the protocol. These techniques are also used in our URMT and USMT protocols. In the protocol, there are following two cases: (a) There exists t + 1 non-faulty wires in the top band; (b) There exists less that t + 1 non-faulty wires in the top band, which implies that at least one wire in the bottom band is non-faulty.
Phase I: S to R 1. S selects a random polynomial p(x) of degree t over F such that p(0) = m S and computes the secret shares (s
In addition, corresponding to each wire f i in top band, S selects a random non-zero three tuple (a
2. S sends {s
,n } and the three tuple (a
Computation by R at the end of Phase I:
is a valid share. Otherwise, it is an invalid share. If R receives t + 1 valid shares then R recovers the secret m R from these valid shares and terminates. Otherwise, R proceeds to execute Phase II. [5] During Phase I, S constructs (t + 1)-out-of-n secret shares of m S and associates one share with one wire in the top band. In order to authenticate the share associated with a wire, S selects n pair of random authentication keys. S then sends to R the share associated with a wire, authenticated with all the n keys. Parallely, S sends the authentication keys to R, one over each wire. In addition, S associates a random three tuple with each wire and sends it to R. If there are t + 1 non-faulty wires in the top band, then at the end of Phase I, R will get at least t + 1 correct shares with which he can recover m R . The Phase I of Π Existing is given in Table 1 .
If R cannot recover the secret m R at the end of Phase I, then it implies that there is at least one honest wire in the bottom band. In this case, using the wires in the bottom band, S and R tries to correctly and securely agree on a shared authentication key and encryption key to securely communicate m S from S to R. For this, R uses the 3-tuples (a R i , b R i , c R i ) which R has received from S. Now R sends a random non-zero 2-tuple (d R i , e R i ) to S on each wire in bottom band. In addition, each such 2-tuple is authenticated by u random non-zero keys, so that S can verify whether it has correctly received the 2-tuples. Now according to the values that S receives from R, S divides the bottom band into consistent sub-sets B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B k , where k ≤ u, such that for each 1 ≤ l ≤ k, all the wires in B l behave in a "consistent" way. In particular, there exists at least one path set B l that behave honestly during Phase II. Though S cannot determine which path set was honest, S will try to use each of them in a separate way and let R to determine which path set is honest. The computation and communication by R during Phase II and the computation by S at the end of Phase II is shown in Table 2 . Phase II: R to S (if R has not recovered the secret at the end of Phase I)
Computation by S at the end of Phase II: 
S computes the set of wires in top band From the properties of U Rauth and hash, it is easy to check that the following holds: (a) If b i is an honest wire in the bottom band and b i ∈ B l , then with very high probability, the random 2-tuples that S has received along the wires in B l are not modified; (b) If b i is an honest wire in the bottom band and b i ∈ B l , then B l is an acceptable set. However, all the acceptable sets look same to S and S cannot determine whether an acceptable set contains all honest wires or wires controlled by the adversary. In the worst case, the adversary can control the bottom band in such a way that there are at most u B l 's, with one wire from the bottom band in each B l . S continues the protocol by assuming that each acceptable set is correct. In other words, assuming that all the wires in an acceptable set B l are non-faulty, S determines which of the random 3-tuples (a S i , b S i , c S i ), (that it had sent to R during Phase I) have been correctly received by R. Using these "correctly-received-by-R" 3-tuples and the random 2-tuples received by S via the wires in B l , S computes the authentication key and encryption key to securely send the messages to R. If the assumption that B l contains only non-faulty wires is valid, then R would be able to compute the same authentication and encryption key. Since at least one of the acceptable path set is non-faulty, R will be able to decrypt the secret message correctly. The communication by S during Phase III and message recovery by R is shown in Table 3 .
Phase III: S to R: For each acceptable set B l and the corresponding set F l , S does the following:
• From the wires in F l and B l , S computes his version of the keys C
. Message Recovery by R: R knows that in the worst case, S could have sent u 2-tuples over each wire in the top band, corresponding to the case when there are u acceptable sets. Let R receives (ψ It is easy to check that with very high probability, m R recovered by R is the same as m S . Since, for an acceptable set B l , |F l | + |B l | > t, the adversary learns no information about C S l or D S l and hence about m S . Thus the protocol achieves perfect privacy. 
Modified Version of Desmedt's USMT Protocol
We now present a modified version of protocol Π Existing , called Π Existing modif ied , where all the computation and communication is done in the field F. The purpose of presenting Π Existing modif ied is to introduce certain new techniques, which we have also used in our later protocols. Protocol Π Existing modif ied will be used as a sub-protocol in our final communication optimal URMT and USMT protocols. The protocol securely sends a message 3 ) elements from F with very high probability.
During Phase I, S selects a random polynomial M S (x) over F of degree n − 1 + t such that the lower order
denotes the j th , 1 ≤ j ≤ n row of T . Now the communication by S during Phase I and the computation by R at the end of Phase I is expressed in Table 5 . 
If R has received t+1 valid rows, then R reconstructs the secret m R from them and terminates protocol (see Theorem 1). Otherwise, R proceeds to execute Phase II. 
The lemma is true if wire f j is uncorrupted. If f j is corrupted, then F R j = F S j . In this case, if F R j is valid then it implies that Support j ≥ t + 1. Since there can be at most t corrupted wires in the top band, this implies that there exists an honest wire, say f i , which correctly delivered the hash key
But from the properties of unconditional hashing, it can happen with probability at most
|F| , which is negligible in our context. 2
Lemma 2 During Phase I, at least n coefficients of M S (x) are information theoretically secure.
Proof:
We consider the worst case, when A t controls at most t wires in the top band. Without loss of generality, let these be the first t wires. So A t will know the vectors F S 1 , F S 2 , . . . , F S t , from which it will come to know t distinct points of the polynomials is of length n + t. So from the properties of unconditional hashing, (n + t) − t = n coefficients of F S t+1 will be information theoretic secure. This further implies that n coefficients of M S (x) are information theoretically secure.
2 Theorem 1 If R gets t + 1 valid rows then R can securely recover m S with very high probability.
Proof: From Lemma 1, with very high probability, each valid row is indeed sent by S. If R gets t + 1 valid rows, then from them, R gets t + 1 distinct points on each f S i (x). Since each f S i (x) is of degree t, using the t + 1 valid rows, R reconstructs each f S i (x) and hence f S i (0) = M S (i). Now using the M S (i)'s, R interpolates M S (x) and recovers m S . The security of m S follows from Lemma 2.
2 If R does not get t + 1 valid rows, then R concludes that at least one wire in the bottom band is honest. So R proceeds to execute Phase II as shown in Table 6 . Phase II is similar to the Phase II of protocol Π Existing , except that β R contains the hashed value of each n + 1 tuple received from S. Moreover, along each wire in the bottom band, R now sends an (n + u) tuple and hash it with u random keys. Now as in protocol Π Existing , depending upon the values received along the wires in the bottom band, S divides the bottom band into different subsets. As in the previous protocol, from the properties of hash function, it is straightforward to check that the following holds: (a) If b i is an honest wire in the bottom band and b i ∈ B l , then with very high probability, the random (n + u)-tuples that S has received along the wires in B l are not modified; (b) If b i is an honest wire in the bottom band and b i ∈ B l , then B l is an acceptable set.
Phase II: R to S (if R has not recovered the secret at the end of Phase I)
1. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, R chooses a random non-zero hash key r R j ∈ F and computes the set
n+u . In order to hash each such n tuple, R selects u random non-zero keys {key
Computation by S at the end of Phase II: For 1 ≤ j ≤ u, S receives β Proof: Follows from the properties of hash function.
2 Now the steps during Phase III and message recovery by R are presented in Table 7 .
Phase III: S to R: For each acceptable set B l and corresponding set P l , S does the following:
1. S considers the first n elements from the n+1 tuples which it had sent over the wires in P l during Phase I and the first n elements from the (n+u) tuples which S had received over the wires in B l during Phase II. By using them, S computes his version of n authentication keys C
), S takes three elements from the keys computed in the previous step and computes the set S , R applies the verification process of U Sauth on c
to reconstruct the secret m R and terminates. 
Unconditionally Secure One Time Pad Establishment Protocol
We now propose a six phase protocol called Π P ad , which securely establishes a random non-zero one time pad between S and R with very high probability by communicating O(n 3 ) field elements. If the entire bottom band is corrupted, then the size of the pad is Θ(n 2 u). Otherwise the size of the pad is Θ(n 3 ). We first design a sub-protocol Π which is used in Π P ad .
Protocol Π: Suppose S and R in advance know that full bottom band is corrupted. This implies that at most t − u and at least t + 1 wires in the top band are corrupted and honest respectively. Under this assumption, we design a sub-protocol Π, which securely establishes an information theoretic secure non-zero random one time pad of size Θ(n 2 u) between S and R by communicating O(n 3 ) field elements, with very high probability. Let c = n 2 +t−u. S selects (t+1)×c random non-zero elements from F, denoted by k
. Now using these elements, S constructs an (t + 1) × c matrix A S , where the j th , 
] T , the n points on q i (x) as shown in Table 8 . Now using the j th , 1 ≤ j ≤ n row of B S , S forms a n 2 + t − u − 1 
S also selects n random and non-zero distinct elements from F, denoted by α S 1 , α S 2 , . . . , α S n . Now the communication by S during Phase I and the computation by R at the end of Phase I is formally expressed in Table 9 . 
S denotes the concatenation of the elements in the first t + 1 rows of B S . S computes
The vector P S denotes the information theoretically secure random pad of size Θ(n 2 u) which will be correctly established with R with very high probability.
is an invalid polynomial. 3. Since there are at least t + 1 honest wires in the top band, R will get at least t + 1 valid polynomials. Now using t + 1 valid polynomials, R will construct array B R . From B R , R computes V R , from which it finally computes P R and terminates. With very high probability, P R = P S (see Lemma 3). Table 9 : Protocol Π
Theorem 3 If the entire bottom band is corrupted, then protocol Π securely establishes a random nonzero pad of size Θ(n 2 uκ) bits by communicating O(n 3 κ) bits.
Proof: Since protocol Π is similar to the Phase I of protocol Π existing modif ied , using similar arguments as in Lemma 1, if F R j (x) is a valid polynomial, then with overwhelming probability F R j (x) = F S j (x). Since, there are at least t + 1 honest wires in the top band, the polynomials corresponding to these wires will always be considered as valid. So R will always get at least t + 1 valid polynomials. Thus using similar arguments as in Lemma 1, R will be able to correctly recover V S and P S with very high probability. The secrecy of P S follows using similar argument as in Lemma 2 and the properties of EXTRAND. It is easy to see that O(n 3 ) field elements and hence O(n 3 κ) bits are communicated by S.
2
Six Phase Protocol Π P ad : We now present the protocol Π P ad which uses protocols Π and Π
Existing modif ied
as black-box. The first two phases of the protocol are given in Table 10 .
Before proceeding further, we prove the following claim. Proof: The proof follows from the properties of hash function.
2 As in protocol Π existing modif ied , from the properties of hash function, it is straightforward to check that the following holds: (a) If f i is an honest wire in the top band and f i ∈ F l , then with very high probability, the random (n 2 + t)-tuples that R has received along the wires in F l are not modified; (b) If f i is an honest wire in the top band and f i ∈ F l , then F l is an acceptable set.
Phase I: R to S: Corresponding to each wire bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ u in the bottom band, R selects a random non-zero n 2 + 1 tuple (y In the worst case, in R's view, there can be at most t + 1 acceptable sets because the adversary can control at most t wires in the top band. So there can be t acceptable sets, corresponding to t corrupted wires and one acceptable set corresponding to all the honest wires in the top band. The Phase III of the protocol is shown in Table 11 .
Theorem 4
If the entire bottom band is corrupted then Π P ad securely establishes a random non-zero pad of size Θ(n 2 κ) bits between S and R with very high probability. Otherwise, it establishes a random non-zero pad of size Θ(n 3 κ) bits between S and R with very high probability. In either case, the protocol terminates in six phases and communicates O(n 3 κ) bits.
Proof: Follows from the protocol description and properties of hash and EXTRAND. 2
URMT with Constant Factor Overhead
Let u ≤ t and n = max(2t − u + 1, t + 1). Then we present an URMT protocol called Π U RM T which sends a message m S containing field elements by communicating O( ) field elements with very high probability, where = (t − u 2 + 1)n 2 = Θ(n 3 ). The total communication complexity of the protocol is O(n 3 ) field elements and the protocol terminates in O(u) phases. The principle behind the protocol is to create a win-win situation as follows: if the adversary corrupts at most t − u 2 wires in the top band, then R recovers the message from the information which it receives from the honest wires in the top band. On the other hand, if more than t − u 2 wires are corrupted in the top band, then majority wires in the bottom band will be honest and so both S and R comes to know about the identity of corrupted wires in the top band by using the honest wires in the bottom band. Now using this information, S can re-send m S so that R can recover it correctly.
As a part of pre-processing step, S and R securely establishes Θ(n) random non-zero elements from F with each other in advance with very high probability by executing the three phase protocol Π existing modif ied . Let the set of these elements be denoted by K. The elements in K will be used by S and R as authentication and hash keys to reliably exchange the outcome of certain steps during the execution of the protocol Π U RM T . Note that elements in K need not be distinct, but they are randomly selected from F. We assume that initially all the elements in K are marked as "unused". Each time S (R)
Phase III: R to S: For each acceptable set F l and corresponding set B l , R does the following:
1. R concatenates the first n 2 elements from (n 2 + 1) and (n 2 + t) tuples, which it had sent and received over the wires in B l and F l respectively. Let V R l denotes the resultant vector.
Corresponding to vector V
Computation by S at the end of Phase III: Now using the hash value(s) received from R, S tries to find whether there exists at least one uncorrupted wire in the bottom band. For this, S does the following: takes three phases, the protocol will terminate at the end of Phase VI.
4.
If the test in step 3 fails for all l and j, then S concludes that entire bottom band is corrupted. In this case, S sends a special "failure" value from F to R by executing the three phase Π existing modif ied protocol. Parallely, S establishes a secure pad P S 2 of size Θ(n 2 u) with R by executing single phase Protocol Π. At the end of Π existing modif ied , R will know that the entire bottom band is corrupted. Parallely at the end of Π, R will output P R 2 , with which very high probability is same as P S 2 . Since Π existing modif ied takes three phases, the protocol will terminate at the end of Phase VI. Table 11 : Phase III in Protocol Π P ad needs a key(s) for hashing or authentication, then the first "unused" element(s) from K is/are selected as key(s). In order to do the verification, R (S) also uses the same element(s) from K as keys. Once the verification is done, the element(s) is/are marked as "used" Thus we can view K as a global set, which is parallely used and updated by both S and R.
Let
+1,n 2 ] be the message. S constructs an array B S of size n × n 2 from m S in the same way as in protocol Π with the following modifications: S first constructs the array A S of size (t − u 2 + 1) × n 2 from m S , where the
. By considering the elements in individual columns as distinct points, S interpolates the unique (t − u 2 ) degree polynomial passing through them. S then further evaluates the interpolated polynomials at additional (t − u 2 ) values of x and gets the array B S . Now by considering the elements along j th , 1 ≤ j ≤ n row of B S as coefficients, S constructs F S j (x) of degree n 2 − 1. First two phases of Π U RM T is shown in Table 12 .
Phase I: S to R: Along wire f j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, S sends to R the polynomial F S j (x), a random non-zero value α S j and n tuple [v
Phase II: R to S
Corresponding to graph G R , R constructs a conflict list Y R of five tuples where for each arc (fi, fj) ∈ E R , there exists a five tuple (fi, fj, α Before proceeding further, we prove the following claim.
Claim 3 Let f i be a wire which has delivered incorrect F
to R and f j be an honest wire. Then with very high probability
But this can happen with probability at most
can have same value at atmost n 2 − 1 such α's as both are of degree n 2 − 1. Since |F| = poly(κ)2 κ , this probability is negligible.
2 Now S considers the conflict list which it receives identically through at least u 2 + 1 wires. If S does not receives any conflict list identically through at least u 2 + 1 wires, then S concludes that at least u 2 + 1 wires are corrupted in the bottom band, which further implies that at most t − u 2 − 1 wires are corrupted in the top band. In this case, the protocol proceeds as shown in Table 13 .
Phase III: S to R: By selecting two elements from K as authentication keys, S authenticates an unique special predetermined signal "terminate" and sends to R. R receives the signal correctly with very high probability and concludes that at most t − u 2 wires have delivered incorrect values during Phase I. So by using the polynomials received along the first t − u 2 + 1 wires in P R during Phase I, R constructs the array B R . From B R , R recovers m R and terminates. The correctness of the protocol in this execution sequence is proved in Lemma 3. Proof: If S does not receive the same conflict list through at least u 2 + 1 wires then it implies that at least u 2 + 1 wires in the bottom band are corrupted which further implies that at most t − u 2 − 1 wires in the top band are corrupted. So, with very high probability, the wires in the set P R have correctly delivered the polynomials during Phase I. This is because if some wire f j in the top band has delivered F R j (x) = F S j (x) during Phase I, then f j can be supported by at most t − u 2 − 1 wires in the top band (which are corrupted) and with very high probability, f j will be contradicted by all the honest wires in the top band, implying Support j = t − u 2 − 1 which further implies that f j ∈ P R . Since there are at least (2t − u + 1) − (t − u 2 − 1) = t − u 2 + 2 wires in the top band, these wires will always be in P R . Now by using the polynomials received over the wires in P R , R can correctly reconstruct the array B S and hence A S . This is because, any (t − 
Lemma 3 If S does not receives the same conflict list through at least
If any of these test fails then S concludes that wire f j has delivered incorrect values to R during Phase I and adds f j to a list L S f ault . On the other hand, if both the test passes then S checks
If the test fails then S concludes that wire f i has delivered incorrect F R i (x) = F S i (x) to R during Phase I and adds f i to L S f ault . Note that S does not know whether Y S is a genuine conflict list and is indeed sent by R. But still S computes L S f ault . S now finds the cardinality of list L S f ault . Now there are two possible cases. If |L S f ault | ≤ (t − u 2 ), then S concludes that at least t − u 2 + 1 wires have delivered correct polynomial during Phase I. S then performs the same computation as shown in Table 13 . The correctness of the protocol in this execution sequence is proved in Lemma 4.
, then with very high probability, R can correctly recover m S from the polynomials delivered by the wires in P R .
Proof: If Y S = Y R , then the lemma follows using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3. This is because now at least u 2 + 1 wires in the bottom band are corrupted. We now consider the case when Y S = Y R . From Claim 3, if a corrupted wire f i has delivered incorrect F R i (x) = F S i (x) to R and f j is an honest wire, then with very high probability (f i , f j ) ∈ E R . Correspondingly, there will be a 5-tuple present in Y R and hence in Y S . From this 5-tuple, S will easily find out that R has received incorrect polynomial over f j . Thus, if Y S = Y R , then S will come to know the exact identity of all the corrupted wires which delivered incorrect polynomials during Phase I and they will be present in list
, this implies that at most t − u 2 polynomials were delivered incorrectly and hence at least t − u 2 + 1 polynomials were delivered correctly which will be present in P R . The rest of the proof now follows using similar argument as in Lemma 3.
, then S further communicates with R to find whether Y S was indeed sent by R. For this, S and R executes the steps as shown in Table 14 . Phase IV: R to S:
) from S along wire fj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. From these values, R now tries to find out whether S has correctly received the original Y R over more that + 1 wires in P R during Phase I. Moreover, by selecting next two "unused" elements k 1 , k 2 from K as authentication keys, R computes response 1 = U Rauth("terminate"; k 1 , k 2 ) where "terminate" is an unique pre-defined special element from F. R then send the tuple ("terminate", response 1 ) to S through the bottom band and terminates.
3. If during step 1, there exists a j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
, then R concludes that S has correctly received original Y R over more that Note that if there are more than one such j (whose probability is negligible), then R arbitrarily selects one. Now by selecting k1, k2 from K as authentication keys, R computes response 2 = U Rauth("continue"; k1, k 2 ) where "continue" is an unique pre-defined special element from F. R then send the tuple ("continue", response 2 ) to S through the bottom band.
Computation by S at the end of Phase IV: S checks whether it is getting any 2-tuple identically over at least 
Before proceeding further, we prove the following lemma. . Now both S and R knows that at least one wire among these u 2 wires is honest. S now re-sends m S by executing the steps given in Table 15 . This will take Θ(u) phases.
, each of size
. Moreover S and R initializes variables wc S = 1, bc S = 1 and wc R = 1, bc R = 1 respectively. S and R now executes the following steps: S by one. Moreover, S authenticates an unique pre-defined special "increment-wire" element from F by using two keys from the set K and sends it to R through the top band. R correctly receives the signal with very high probability and accordingly increments wc R by one.
On the other hand, if the test succeeds then S concludes that wire f wc S has delivered correct B S bc S to R. So S increments bc S by one. Moreover, S authenticates an unique pre-defined special "increment-block" value from F by using two keys from the set K and sends it to R through the top band. R correctly receives the signal with very high probability and accordingly increments bc R by one.
2. If all the blocks of m S are sent then both S and R terminates. Otherwise S concatenates all the remaining blocks of m S and sends to R through wire f u 2 and terminates. R correctly receives these blocks and terminates. 
Upper Bound on the Communication Complexity of USMT
We now design an O(u) phase USMT protocol called Π U SM T , which sends a message M S containing field elements by communicating O(n 3 ) field elements with very high probability. If the full bottom band is corrupted then = Θ(n 2 u), otherwise = Θ(n 3 ). The protocol uses Π P ad and Π U RM T as black-box. The protocol is given in Table 16. 1. Depending upon whether the full bottom band is corrupted or not, S and R securely establishes a random non-zero one time pad P ad of length Θ(n 2 u) or Θ(n 3 ) with very high probability by executing the protocol Π P ad .
2. If P ad is of length Θ(n 2 u), then S selects a secret message M S of length Θ(n 2 u). S then computes C = M S ⊕P ad and reliably sends C to R with very high probability by executing the protocol Π U RM T . R correctly receives C with very high probability and recovers M R = C ⊕ P ad. On the other hand, if P ad is of length Θ(n 3 ), then S and R does the same computation, except that M S and C (and hence M R ) will be of length Θ(n 3 ). 
Lower Bound on the Communication Complexity of USMT
An obvious lower bound on the communication complexity of URMT protocols to send a message containing field elements is Ω( ). Since, we have already shown that this bound is tight by designing the URMT protocol Π U RM T , we need not have to prove the lower bound for URMT protocols. Similarly, if at least one wire in the bottom band is uncorrupted, then Ω( ) is a trivial lower bound on the communication complexity of any USMT protocol which securely sends field elements. Again, since we have already shown that this bound is tight by designing protocol Π U SM T (which securely sends field elements by communicating field elements if there exists at least one uncorrupted wire in the bottom band), we need not have to prove the lower bound for this case. We now prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of USMT protocols where the entire bottom band is corrupted. Proof: Note that if u > t, then at least one wire in the bottom band is uncorrupted and so the lower bound of Ω( ) holds. So, we consider the case where u ≤ t. Suppose both S and R in advance knows that the entire bottom band is corrupted. Under this assumption, any multiphase USMT protocol virtually reduces to a single phase USMT protocol, where S is connected to R by n = 2t − u + 1 wires, of which at most t − u are corrupted. Since perfect secrecy is required in USMT, the data sent along the n wires in any single phase USMT protocol must be such that data on any set of (t − u) wires has no information about the secret message, otherwise the adversary will also know the secret message by passively listening the contents of these wires. Similarly, the data sent over any (n − (t − u)) honest wires during the protocol has full information about the secret message. The latter requirement ensures that even if the adversary simply blocks/corrupts all the data that he can, the secret message is not lost and therefore the receiver's ability to recover the message is not completely ruled out.
Let X i denotes the i th share of some valid distribution scheme and let m denote the secret message containing field elements chosen from F . For any subset A ⊆ {1, 2 . . . n} let X A denote the set of variables {X i |i ∈ A}. Then the secret m and the shares X i are random variables. For a random variable X, let H(X) denote its entropy [4] . Roughly speaking, entropy quantifies the information contained in a message, usually in bits or symbols. Since m is drawn uniformly at random from F , we have H(m) = . Since in any single phase USMT protocol, the data sent along any set B consisting of (n − (t − u)) honest wires have full information about m, we have H(m|X B ) = 0.
Consider any subset A ⊂ B such that |A| = (t − u). Since the data sent along the wires in A is insufficient to retrieve any information about the message m we get H(m|X A ) = H(m). From the chain rule of the entropy [4] , for any two random variable X 1 , X 2 , we have H(X 1 , X 2 ) = H(X 2 ) + H(X 1 |X 2 ). Here H(X 1 , X 2 ) denotes the joint entropy of X 1 , X 2 . Informally, the joint entropy measures how much entropy is contained in a joint system of two random variables. Similarly, H(X 1 |X 2 ) denotes conditional entropy of X 1 on X 2 . Informally, it quantifies the remaining entropy (i.e. uncertainty)
